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Most universities in Germany are public firms but they have many properties of co-
operatives. The most important thereof are described and analysed together with the 
characteristics of state-sponsorship. The real companions of the university as a co-operation 
are its professors. The same is true for the faculty level, perhaps even more so. However, 
especially the students are also organised in a co-operative form as are the representatives of 
all membership groups together. The state is making some crucial reforms that transform this 
university model or may even destroy it. In any case, the change is slow, painful and open-
ended.   
 








Die meisten Universitäten in Deutschland sind öffentliche Unternehmen, besitzen jedoch viele 
Eigenschaften von Genossenschaften. Die wichtigsten davon werden zusammen mit den 
Besonderheiten der staatlichen Finanzierung beschrieben und analysiert. In der Universität als 
Genossenschaft kommt vor allem den Professoren die Rolle der Genossen zu. Dies gilt 
ebenfalls und vielleicht sogar besonders auf der Fakultätsebene. Allerdings sind auch die 
Studierenden sowie die Vertreter aller universitären Gruppen gemeinsam genossenschaftlich 
organisiert. Der Staat führt gegenwärtig einige bedeutende Reformen durch, welche dieses 
Universitätsmodell transformieren oder vielleicht sogar zerstören. In jedem Fall ist der Ver-
änderungsprozess langsam, mühevoll und im Ergebnis offen. 
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1. Introduction 
Most universities in Germany
1 and also in some other, especially European countries, can be 
characterised as state-sponsored co-operatives.
2 Legally, these universities are not co-
operatives, of course, but public firms mostly run by the German Länder (states). Factually, 
however, they work or at least until recently worked as co-operatives
3 with some peculiarities 
like being financed by the state and having a non-distribution constraint as non-profits. Thus, 
these universities are quite hybrid organisations. The interplay of their different characteristics 
will be analysed in the following with a special emphasis on their character as co-operatives 
getting most of their money from the state.
4 
 
In the next section, the German universities will be described with an emphasis on their co-
operative character at the level of the professors. The third section looks at the impact of 
tenure for professors, at their remaining incentives without the risk of lay-offs or pay-cuts and 
at the importance of their abilities and intrinsic motivation. Section four broadens the 
perspective by including the other membership groups of universities, the untenured academic 
staff, non-academic employees and students. In section five the current reforms of the 
university system by the state are considered. Section six is a short conclusion.   
 
2. Universities as Co-operatives of Professors 
In this article, universities are taken as co-operatives but the associates of such co-operatives 
do not include all members of the universities to the same degree. The most important group 
are the tenured professors building a co-operative of their own in a way. Especially their 
rights and freedoms are protected by the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), by which they must have a 
                                                 
1 This article covers public universities in Germany only. Private universities with just a small share of all 
students and the quite important colleges of higher education, which started to call themselves universities of 
applied sciences, are explicitly excluded. Nevertheless, many insights can be transferred to the latter as long as 
they are state-sponsored. 
2 Although this idea is quite simple and not new, surprisingly there does not seem to exist any single paper which 
scrutinises it explicitly. Backes-Gellner/Sadowski (1989) come nearest to doing this, but even they do not 
analyse the state-sponsorship of most German universities. James/Neuberger (1981) and Glaeser (2003) examine 
private universities, especially American ones, as non-profit co-operatives. Hunter (1981) adopts this to British 
universities, also without considering the peculiarities resulting from them being financed by the state.   
3 For economic analyses of proper co-operatives and their problems see Bonus 1986, Pejovich 1990, Wolfstetter 
1990 or Kräkel 2004: 362-372. 
4 There are probably other sectors with comparable properties, i.e. hospitals, museums, churches (cf. for these 
without state-sponsorship Glaeser 2003) or political parties.    
   3
majority in academic affairs. They select new associates by themselves, hire and potentially 
fire other academics and have, at least together, much power over all other employees of the 
university and the students as its further members. Thus, the university as a whole is anything 
but an equitable co-operative, it is very hierarchical with unequal rights.
5 Nevertheless, at the 
level of tenured professors it resembles more or less a co-operative with equal rights. For 
instance, every professor has one vote in meetings or at least in electing professors’ 
representatives, the accumulation of votes is not possible. The leaders of universities are 
mostly professors and are elected by their colleagues. In a way, a university can be compared 
to an ancient Greek polis with a strong democracy and many rights for a small segment of 
society, namely the free, often land-owning males of a certain age, whereas all other people 
like women, strangers, young men or slaves had much less or none rights at all.  
 
This last point that all other groups have virtually no rights is not completely true for non-
professors at German universities. Since the 1960s at the latest, all groups have been 
represented at decision-making bodies. Besides the professors, these groups are the other, 
mostly untenured academics who are not professors, the non-academic workers like 
administrators, secretaries and housekeepers and last but not least the students. In some states 
the so-called Gruppenuniversität (group-university) was introduced. In it, all four different 
groups had equal voting rights in general matters whereas the majority of the professors in 
academic affairs was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (federal constitutional court, 
the most senior court in Germany). Since then, this model has been watered-down or not been 
introduced in the first round by some states, nevertheless, all groups are somehow represented 
nowadays. Mostly, the professors have a small majority and the other three groups (or 
sometimes only two without the non-academic workers) share the rest equally. However, 
equal rights for groups is not the same as equal rights for the members of these groups. 
Normally, there are much more students than all employees together, such that the vote of a 
student counts much less than that of an employee.  
 
A majority of professorial votes in academic or even all affairs does mean that the professors 
can win every voting as long as they consent and vote together. A wholehearted consent as 
regards content is sometimes possible but quite improbable at all times. Nevertheless, in many 
places all professors do vote together whenever representatives of the other groups 
                                                 
5 It can be compared to a craft or guild from the late Middle Ages when the first universities were established. 
There are still some feudal elements in modern universities whereas contemporary co-operatives are also distant 
successors of guilds.    4
participate.
6 The real voting with open dissent is done before in a meeting of professors only 
whereas the formal meeting of all groups sees a consensus of the professors, who have the 
majority, and is accordingly quite short. Even a professor who disagrees individually and 
voted the other way just one day before will follow the majority. The formally deciding board 
of the faculty as well as the senate of the university are composed of representatives of the 
different groups, such that a professor who does not follow the norm to vote with her or his 
colleagues risks losing the next re-election.  
 
Nevertheless, such a norm to vote en bloc by professors does not exist in every faculty or 
even less often in whole universities. An alternative is that some professors, normally the 
most powerful (at least afterwards), seek an alliance with the other groups to win against 
some of their own colleagues. This is especially likely if there are more divergent interests 
within groups than between them. In most cases, the other groups can trade their voting rights 
without much concern for them to get some say in matters more important to them (and 
probably not that important for the allied professors). The same kind of votes’ exchange can 
be observed between professors to establish a durable majority. It is also not unusual to try to 
influence who is voting. At least at the faculty level it is quite easy to encourage one’s own 
staff to run for mandates as representatives of the other groups. The meetings of the board of 
faculty are often boring and do not offer much personal gain such that there are not many 
independent candidates and little encouragement with individual incentives can be enough to 
stand and win with high probability. Interested professors will campaign themselves and 
nominate their buddies, too. Even the selection of new professors will be affected by the 
consideration how and with whom they may vote in the future (cf. James/Neuberger 1981: 
603). This is why the real voting power can be quite unequal even though every professor has 
exactly one vote. 
 
Unlike most real co-operatives, universities have a non-distribution constraint characteristic of 
non-profit organisations (NPOs) or also public firms to which universities properly belong. 
However, the autonomy of universities is much higher than for most other public firms such 
that the comparison to a NPO is most fruitful here. In spite of its name, a NPO is allowed to 
                                                 
6  The situation is comparable to co-determination at the company level in Germany. Nominally, in large 
companies there is an equal number of labour and owner representatives on the supervisory board but the 
chairman coming from the owners’ side has the decisive vote in case of a stalemate. Anticipating this, a crucial 
vote is extremely rare.     5
make profits
7 but is forbidden to distribute them to its members. This hinders a direct payment 
of surplus money but there are more indirect (and probably more costly) ways in which 
members can participate in the performance of their NPO or in this case of their university.
8 
Most common are some non-monetary perks and benefits (cf. Williamson 1963 for their use 
by managers in for-profit companies). The offices are normally much larger at public 
universities in Germany than at private ones or even elite-universities in the USA. At least 
some professors have a quite high number of staff which is not always completely justified by 
the lot of work to be done (others can do the same with less assistants). There is money to be 
used for computers, books or business trips with only formal monitoring.  
 
Much more important is the freedom concerning one’s own time. There is no compulsory 
attendance for professors. They should only be present to fulfil their teaching obligations of 
traditionally eight to nowadays in some states nine hours (school-hours of 45 minutes) a week 
while the university is in session about fifteen weeks each semester, that is about thirty weeks 
or 240 hours a year. However, there is no strict monitoring of meeting even this obligation. 
Administrators do not stand at the lecture hall, stopwatch in hand to check professors. 
Therefore, it is quite usual to start the semester one week late, to drop one or two sessions in 
between, not counting public holidays, and to use the last week for written examinations, 
monitored by junior staff, not the professors themselves. Some are regularly or at least 
sometimes late to their lectures while closing them a few minutes early. It is not unusual to 
sometimes send an assistant as a replacement. If a professor does this most of the time, there 
may be some chitchat about that but normally there are no more dire consequences. Not 
showing up at all is more risky but even then it will take years to oust a tenured professor. If 
he or she appears sometimes in between or drives away all students such that lectures are 
formally offered but have, alas, to be cancelled lacking any participants, then the job is 
secured. A nobler alternative is to use modern replacements of old-fashioned lecturing and let 
do the students their independent learning in groups, in the field or online – the main thing is 
alone. The still remaining supervision, perhaps even more work than traditional lecturing, can 
be delegated to junior staff.                
 
                                                 
7 Profits are allowed as a by-product but not the main purpose of a non-profit organisation such that not-for-
profit organisations would be a more appropriate name. 
8 A special problem is that professors have no possibility to capitalise their former share in the institution when 
they are leaving. This means that like in a normal co-operative the time horizon of its members is quite short (cf. 
Milgrom/Roberts: 563), especially that of the more senior members who have normally most power.   6
The conclusion of this is not that all professors are afraid of teaching or working in general 
but that they enjoy a lot of freedom to do whatever they want. They may teach, research, 
administer, make money outside the university or simply be lazy. This freedom is the largest 
benefit of a professorship (together with tenure securing this freedom and permanent income). 
For most professors this freedom is much more important than their wage level which is very 
low compared to equally qualified personnel in private companies.
9 This freedom is 
reinforced by the co-operative character of the university. Even nasty abusers of this freedom 
get away with this because their colleagues do not want to know about it, much less want to 
act in such cases. Most want to defend their own freedoms and also the academic freedom in 
principle. They fear that a campaign against great infringements may not halt at their little 
ones, especially if it is initiated from the outside by some administrators. All professors 
together have some interest that everyone shoulders some of the work that has to be done but 
finding or actually punishing single free riders for first-level collective goods like teaching is 
itself a second-order collective good. There are not many who want to make their hands dirty 
by denigrating a colleague who will nevertheless remain for many years to come and may 
take revenge. Moreover, even all other professors together lack strong instruments to punish 
an uncooperative colleague behind frowning. Indeed, they may strip him or her of some 
resources inside the university but cannot diminish his or her paycheque. The risk is to lose 
this person’s cooperation entirely, such that some encouragement to do at least a little bit 
instead of nothing may be the smarter option. 
 
The freedom of every tenured professor is more or less the same and the same logic applies to 
all of them. One may ask why not all of them abuse this freedom. Some may be morally 
scrupulous but a more general and economic explanation refers firstly to different 
circumstances and secondly to different utility functions to explain different behaviour. To 
begin with the latter, moral scruples can be classified as a special argument in utility 
functions. Others can be a propensity to teach or research or different aspirations to prestige. 
An economically even better explanation assumes equal utility functions but different 
circumstances that bring about behavioural differences. For example, younger professors can 
still hope to improve their careers by building good reputations, older professors have 
definitely reached the end of their careers and may try to cash in their reputations whereas 
                                                 
9 Of course there is a connection between this freedom, which is a benefit with monetary value (cf. Lazear 1998: 
377-440), and the lower wage level. The marginal (non-)professor will be indifferent between the lower wage 
with freedom and a higher one without, whereas most professors are happier with the first alternative or at least 
expected to be so when choosing their career and equally qualified persons outside academia prefer the higher 
wages there.   7
professors in between may have learned whether further career dreams are realistic or not. 
From this it follows, everything else equal, that younger professors will do more what is 
expected from them by others (who are important for their careers) than older ones, the same 
is true for more successful ones in middle-age (for  professors who may be in their late 40s or 
early 50s) compared to less successful ones. Very successful professors may try hard still in 
old age to remain famous even long behind their deaths while most others have to recognise at 
some point in their lives that this is quite improbable for them, even though it is never 
impossible. 
 
Another important explanation of differences is specialisation, maybe initially driven by some 
former differences itself but multiplying them over time. There is specialisation in different 
fields and subfields on the one hand, and between teaching, research and other activities on 
the other hand. Who is specialised in a narrow subject is normally better in this than other 
people not that much specialised in it even if the latter one may be much smarter in general 
than the former one. A distinguishing feature of a traditional German university is the attempt 
to cover as many different subjects as possible, at best all of them as a really universal 
university. Inside each field, there is the aim to cover most if not all possible subfields. This 
means there seldom are two experts for the same at one university. Moreover, every professor 
has to cover quite wide a (sub)field, at least in teaching. The university is a co-operative of 
complementary, not substitutive professors. Everyone is necessary but nobody knows in detail 
what a colleague is doing. At the same time, the work of professors, particularly their 
research, can only be evaluated by their peers. Accordingly, such evaluation and also co-
operation in research are done more by and with professors from other universities than 
colleagues at the same location. 
  
In teaching, a broad covering of many disciplines can be seen as an advantage, at any rate 
from the point of view of the whole university and its students. In research, specialisation 
seems to be a greater advantage bringing about better or at least more visible results. From 
these two trends follows either decoupling more general teaching from highly specialised 
research (and thereby losing any synergies between teaching and research) or substituting 
world-leading research for more general and applied forms. Some professors may even decide 
to drop research altogether (or declare their teaching material as research output), whereas 
waiving the formal and for all equal teaching obligations is not allowed. That is why strongly 
research-oriented professors may try to leave the university in favour of mere research   8
institutes or foreign universities with other rules. In the meantime or in perpetuity they may 
elude serious teaching by the ways described above.  
 
Some years ago, at nearly all universities and faculties there was a clear awareness that 
teaching was the main common good. The value of research was well acknowledged but it 
was understood that the researcher individually earns reputation for it such that a 
specialisation in research only is quite egoistic and uncooperative because the colleagues, who 
perhaps would like to research more themselves, end with more teaching to do. Even Nobel 
prize winners were expected to do their fair share in teaching. This policy is nominally still in 
effect, factually it is eroding. The reputation for good or better excellent research is more 
important nowadays. Faculties and even whole universities can gain not only reputation but 
tangible money by such research often done by only a few of its members or even a single 
one. Therefore, the positive external effects of research are larger now than in the past. 
 
However, the collectively important aspects of research may differ from the 
individualistically rewarding ones. Individual reputation as a good researcher is mostly earned 
by publications, in the sciences and some social sciences like economics mainly by articles in 
doubled-blindly peer-reviewed journals, in the arts still more often by monographs. The state 
does not know how (and why) to appreciate this, instead it gives money for large and visible 
projects and to add on third-party funds
10. For the university as a co-operative this means that 
attracting such projects and third-party funds is an important collective good whatever one 
thinks of their academic value, as long as the additional means are not totally appropriated by 
those attracting these projects and funds. Publications remain rather individual undertakings, 
mostly a means to other ends of the co-operative like better ranking places or attracting more 
funds. 
 
Managing projects and wooing for third-party funds can be seen as a third possible 
specialisation besides teaching and (pure) research. This can be done within accounts of the 
university which may profit from this, for example by add-ons from the state, outside the 
university by an associated institute or some other NPO, finally on a professor’s own account 
to his or her personal gain. A professor needs a permission to do sideline jobs like consulting 
                                                 
10 One important source of third-party funds is the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research 
Association) itself financed by public money and organised like a national co-operative of researchers by itself. 
This co-operative seems to function quite well perhaps because its representatives are elected nationally for their 
high reputation. In any case, such academic research funds are fundamentally different from non-academic 
financiers who are interested in practical results for themselves.     9
but it is not too hard to get one. There are many professors who earn much more outside their 
professorship than inside. The really big money is made, as probably in most cases, by using 
the work of others. In some, legally problematic, cases these other workers are those from the 
university. More frequently, a professor will hire additional labour outside the university 
perhaps offering some additional incentives like a doctoral promotion. Using the title of a 
professor has also some additional value with clients. Such business by professors may be 
styled as applied research but normally its results have been fully paid for and remain secret. 
It is a typical case of a private good, at the most additionally (and unjustifiably) subsidised by 
public money. This means, the university as a co-operative does not win resources here but 
loses the labour of the professor and possibly his or her staff, too. Additionally, there are some 
reputational risks for the university if the client is not satisfied with the professor or the 
reputation of the client is poor and rub offs on the university. 
 
The opportunities to engage in this kind of money-making are different for various faculties. 
In some faculties like engineering, law, management or (with some peculiarities) medicine, a 
lot of money can be made outside the university. However, this is true for all professionals in 
these professions, not only professors, who may use a side job as compensation for abstaining 
from a full-time career outside of academia. As long as it is only an add-on for hard working 
professors who would not have come in the first place without it, this is alright for the 
university and only a kind of wage differentiation given rigid nominal pay at the university. 
The risk for the university as a co-operative, and that also means for all other professors, is 
that earning money outside of the university becomes the main occupation for some.      
 
3. Tenure and Incentives for Professors  
A large, as yet under-researched difference to normal co-operatives is that German 
universities do not have to earn the major part of their money on the market but receive it 
from the state. This is true for the university as a whole, which hands most money down to the 
faculties, and also for individual professors, who are paid by the state directly.
11 The 
individual income of professors is guaranteed and their tenure as civil servants is a much 
stronger guarantee against dismissal than in nearly any other country worldwide. There is no 
normal way how a professor could be fired even if he or she is lazy, incompetent or no longer 
                                                 
11 There have been very recent changes in some states, for example North-Rhine Westphalia, where professors 
are now civil servants of the university and only indirectly of the state itself. Therefore, they are paid by the 
university but are insured against its insolvency, comparable to communal civil servants.     10
needed.
12 Only if a professor commits a serious criminal offence or malfeasance, a 
dishonourable discharge is possible, but such cases are extremely rare. More often but 
nevertheless quite seldom, there are offers for early retirement with high pensions. 
     
This guarantee of the individual salary combined with tenure allows professors to take higher 
risks than normal employees. The risks in academia normally do not make headlines but 
because of extremely specialised human capital they are nevertheless quite high. However, 
this is primarily true for the younger, untenured academics such that the professorship can be 
seen as a prize in a tournament (cf. Lazear/Rosen 1981) between them. In academia, there is 
also one additional justification for tenure, the freedom of teaching and research. Without 
tenure there is the risk of losing one’s job just for doing it properly and saying or writing an 
opinion or even definitive truth that someone else who is more powerful does not like.
13 The 
history of academia is full of examples that this risk is not only hypothetical but very real. 
Even in Germany today, untenured academics are well advised to be careful with what they 
say or write. Powerful people in society at large are less of a danger than other academics who 
may decide about their future.   
 
As soon as scholars become professors, the perks of professorships lock them into their jobs. 
Job changes out of academia are very rare. Moreover, someone who worked hard for many 
years or even decades to get this job does not want to leave it lightly. Not getting or even not 
having a professorship is seen as a flaw in a way. The valuation of tenure at public 
universities can be seen from the reluctance to switch to private universities or foreign ones, 
even though they have their own, less secure kinds of tenure and at least in same cases pay 
more. Another obstacle to such changes are public pensions, which are not easily and only 
partially transferable. 
 
The downside of totally secure tenure with guaranteed salary is that the risk of firing or lower 
pay cannot be used as an incentive. Most civil servants, including professors, will appreciate 
their own job security but may dislike it in others. Normally, the former feeling is much 
                                                 
12 Even if a university falls apart, which traditionally does not happen anyway (they are merged at the utmost), 
the job of a professor is secure, deleting one strong performance incentive that is present in normal co-operatives 
and yet for their most entrenched associates.  
13 An analogue argument can be made concerning teaching. The evaluation of professors by students becomes 
more important. However, professors of public universities still can take the liberty of giving correct or actually 
quite bad grades. Whereas there is grade inflation at private universities or more precisely grade compression to 
the very high end, public universities are better in rating their students in a differentiated way or even separating 
out some of them.    11
stronger than the latter, such that all would stand together to defend this privilege. 
Nevertheless, the loss of the strongest incentives for most employees is a problem, not only 
for administrators but also for colleagues who are more than co-workers here, namely 
associates in the co-operative with stakes in its success. In lack of these incentives, weaker 
ones may be used. 
 
The university decides how to distribute its resources between the faculties and every faculty 
decides then how to distribute its share between its institutes, normally the realm of one or 
very few professors, and possibly some other aims. At least potentially, an uncooperative 
professor can be stripped off his or her tangible means and staff. Covenants made at the time 
of appointment are legally binding for only five years,
14 nevertheless, they are respected 
normally much longer whereas all resources on top are open for review and can be 
redistributed. However, taking away such resources is a questionable performance incentive 
because the connection to performance is weak or even accidental. Even without good 
performance, someone can keep staff and money or win still more as long as he or she is good 
at power struggles and voting games. Contrariwise, also the best performers may lose 
resources if there is a cutback by the state. The best safeguard against a shortage seems to be 
campaigning for third-party funds from the outside instead of good performance inside the 
university. 
 
Another incentive could be reputation. It is no pleasure to be frowned at by one’s colleagues, 
whereas a good reputation is nice in itself and can help to further one’s career. Yet, the career-
enhancing reputation may be built on other behaviour than the colleagues would like to see. 
Here, the potential conflict between reputation-raising research and locally-needed teaching is 
reinforced. A reputation for really good teaching is much harder to acquire and of less value 
on the labour market for professors anyway. Although a reputation of being a good colleague 
is important and very interesting for potential future colleagues at a hiring committee, it may 
depend on other, sometimes even inverted properties. The colleagues (and even students) at 
the present university have an incentive to give exactly the wrong impression, namely to hold 
a good colleague and praise a bad one away. Rational members of hiring committees will 
anticipate this, such that statements of present colleagues should be heavily depreciated. 
 
                                                 
14 Many years ago, this has been different such that there are still some quite old professors with many assistants 
and other large resources that are taboo.     12
The best incentives are possible if someone wants something that the colleagues can give or 
deny him or her. Because job and wage are secure, there is little scope for other material or 
personnel resources and because reputation has its own problems, the best incentive is to give 
someone a desired post or even just a title. This presupposes that there is some desire for posts 
and titles. A few academics may have chosen the profession simply by want of the title 
professor or before doctor. Perhaps such persons can be further motivated by the title dean, 
president or professor of the year. Others may desire the power of some post in self-
administration, either as an end in itself or to use it for some other end. Such people can be 
motivated to do a lot of work to reach their goal. However, there are two conditions to this 
and there is one additional string attached. Firstly, there needs to be some competition 
concerning such posts or mere titles, at least artificially. As long as none or only one person 
says to want a post, an aspirant will not have to do a lot to get it but may conversely demand 
more to take it. Secondly, competition has to be allowed and must not have been replaced by 
another mechanism like seniority or turn-over every year in alphabetic order. Finally, the 
incentive by posts may have the disadvantage of adverse selection of power-hungry people in 
powerful positions. Certainly there are advantages of specialisation in administration, too, but 
if all professors who are intrinsically motivated by teaching and researching abstain from 
filling the higher positions in their university, then they cannot complain to be governed by 
colleagues with another agenda. Here is the greatest danger that an equitable co-operative 
destroys itself from within. 
 
As there is only a limited role for incentives at the professorial level of a university and no 
possibility to get rid of unwanted colleagues, the hiring process of new professors is most 
crucial.
15 The co-operative as a whole is interested in high intrinsic motivation such that a 
person wants to do something even without external incentives. Moreover, the co-operative is 
interested in high ability such that a person is good in what he or she is doing and comes quite 
far, even with little effort (cf. Dilger 2001: 138). It is relatively easy to see the past 
performance in research. Teaching is less well observable, the same holds for intrinsic 
motivation and to a lesser degree for ability. A high performer must have some ability, of 
course, but the mix of ability and effort is hard to entangle. Moreover, effort is caused by a 
mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The latter is less good for the hiring institution 
because it will be reduced in the future. The incentive for an untenured would-be professor to 
become a tenured professor is much higher than any incentive a university can provide for a 
                                                 
15 A clear downside of strict tenure is that the hiring professors will try to minimise risks while filling a job with 
a high need for creativity and new ideas.   13
tenured professor. In this way, time-tested professors have one advantage to untenured 
applicants: they already could prove that they work on after getting tenure. However, even 
they may have been motivated only by the chance of getting a new and final call. That is why 
looking for some indicators or signals of intrinsic motivation would be a good idea for hiring 
committees.
16 The same holds for evidence of ability independently from effort and also for 
teaching. Strangely, the most important criterion, at least officially, is performance in 
research. The reason seems to be that this can best be measured whereas the other criteria are 
less clear and offer more space for strategic voting. 
 
4. Non-professorial Members of the University 
A clear advantage of using past performance to decide who becomes a new professor is the 
strong incentive effect for all would-be professors. However, this is a very large collective 
good between all universities because professors are normally hired from other universities to 
reduce influence activities and to bring in new ideas. It works nevertheless and there are many 
more incentives for junior academics. First of all, most of them do lack tenure and have short-
term appointments instead. Second, they do not simply want to keep their jobs and earn some 
money but long for certain academic degrees like a promotion or habilitation. The professors 
can terminate their appointments and deny the wanted degrees. Even though this does not 
happen very often, the threat is sufficient and its rare use shows its power as an incentive. 
Furthermore, professors have a long time to screen their academic staff, beginning in 
undergraduate courses, followed by appointments as student assistants, then junior and later 
senior research assistants. Because selection and incentives are so strong, it is no wonder that 
much work is shifted to the temporary academic employees. 
 
The group of non-academic workers like general administration staff, secretaries of the 
professors or janitors is quite another matter. Normally, they have or get tenure while their 
qualification is much lower and the selection process less tough than for professors. The 
salaries of these employees are guaranteed and they have the chance of in-house promotion, 
whereas professors need(ed) a calling from another university to get a raise. Other differences 
to professors are that non-academic employees have a clear hierarchy with everyone having 
one boss, compulsory attendance and less to say in decisions. When professors are the fellows 
                                                 
16 Intrinsic motivation may show itself in doing something that normally is neither expected nor rewarded and 
can only be explained by having fun doing it. Because hiring someone for doing something like that is a kind of 
reward, it is not possible that there is general agreement over time what activities do count here. Nevertheless, 
single hiring committees could search for a temporary measure.        14
of the university as co-operative, then the other employees are just that, employees. Together 
with their tenure, this brings about a peculiar situation of weak incentives, low interest in the 
well-being of the organisation and nearly no possibility to get rid of incompetent or unwilling 
staff. As a result, there are some hard-working top-administrators, some other self-motivated 
and competent employees and many others doing more or less what they want. Their 
superiors, administrators or professors, have to get along with them, pleasing them to get at 
least some work done. Consequently, most work is shifted to the academic staff, even 
administrative or secretaries’ tasks.  
 
Last but not least, the students are by far the largest group of the university. They are 
organised by themselves as co-operatives at the university and the faculty level. The work of 
their representatives is a collective good for all students, present and in the future. 
Accordingly, it is no wonder that most students do not contribute to this work and nearly 
80 % do not even bother to vote for their representatives. Thus, a small group of students with 
an ideological agenda, usually quite left-leaning, and with the prospect of some personal gains 
runs the show, especially at the university level. In the faculties there is even more passivity, 
sometimes filled by one independently active student or two and at other times by a student 
assistant motivated by his or her professor. 
 
Until very recently, there have not been any tuition fees whatsoever. This means, the students 
are the most subsidised group in the university getting teaching and grades for free, at least in 
monetary terms. The other groups are doing work for their remuneration by the state and 
could at least in some cases earn much more outside the university or in a system of private 
universities only. Like the other members of the university, the students and especially their 
representatives are not grateful that they get money or something for free from the state but 
see this as an underprovided right and are used to demand more, often in an embarrassing 
way. This compensates for little real power, often preventing the small improvements that 
realistically would be possible. Some presidents and deans are quite good in using the student 
representatives, trading some symbolic politics for their votes in more mundane matters.                  
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5. University Reforms by the State 
The German university system is changing right now. The main agent of change is the state,
17 
whereas the university’s internal powers try either to resist this change or to make the best of 
it if they have not resigned altogether. The state has strong powers to change the university at 
its will, at least nominally, first by changing the relevant laws and second by providing most 
of the money. Here is the greatest external weakness of the university as a co-operative. It 
does not operate on real markets and does not earn its money from many customers. There are 
at best quasi-markets provided by the state that is at the same time the only important 
customer with monopsony powers. The German university as a co-operative depends on the 
state and is not survivable without it and its money, at least not in its peculiar form. However, 
the co-operative character may be destroyed even when the state keeps sponsoring the 
university but wants to change it too much. At the same time, it is not easy to bring about 
wanted changes by the state because universities are complex organisations and every change 
at one place may have unintended consequences at quite another.  
 
The main aims of the state may be described as saving expenses, academic education for more 
students and world-famous research with better places in international rankings and even 
more Nobel prizes for scholars in Germany. On the one hand, these goals are mutual 
exclusive in a way. On the other hand, merely saving expenses is quite easy by squeezing the 
budget for universities (while ignoring the consequences), more academic degrees can be seen 
as a quantitative goal powered by incentives (while ignoring the quality) and potential Nobel 
prize winners could be bought with a lot of money and concentrated at some elite-universities 
(while ignoring the fate of the numerous other universities). Politicians are working on all 
three fronts with more or less success.  
 
One further factor is the change in the federal structure of Germany. Education in general and 
universities in particular are traditionally and by Basic Law the realm of the federal states, not 
the federation itself. Nevertheless, there was a trend of increasing centralisation by federal law 
and cartelisation between the states. This has been reversed in the recent past and replaced by 
more competition between the states and a withdrawal of the federation. This alone will bring 
about a greater differentiation between German universities, which in the past were believed 
(even if not totally truly) to be more or less equal in quality. The end of this equality (or belief 
                                                 
17 Another important driver of change is increasing international competition for students, professors, ideas etc. 
Also the role of new technologies like the internet has to be emphasised.    16
in it) allows competition and real improvements, at least in some universities. Simultaneously, 
more inequality comes at costs like less motivation in the universities now clearly below 
average or less trust in diplomas such that more screening by companies becomes necessary.   
 
More competition between universities for money and reputation is enough to transform the 
traditional co-operative model at the universities. However, there are much more changes 
putting the co-operative university under stress, perhaps even destroying it. First of all, there 
is a reduction in money in some states, at least in real terms and including all new duties the 
universities have to shoulder like paying pensions or construction by themselves. It seems 
fanciful to expect more performance by giving less and making this even more volatile and 
thereby risky. As long as lump-payments without any incentive effect could be replaced by 
incentive pay this might even work, as long as one ignores the allocation effect that the 
prospect of earning rents attracts better personnel in the first place (cf. Dilger 2001: 136-137). 
 
However, the payment of all existent professors is fixed anyway and they cannot be replaced 
soon enjoying tenure. Only the basic pay of new professors is reduced and some kind of 
incentive pay is introduced for them, resulting in less and more risky pay than that of their 
older colleagues. Moreover, the incentives of the old system and especially for older 
professors are reduced or even abolished. In the past, they could get a raise whenever they had 
a job offer from another university (or from outside academia), now they would have to 
change in the new and less attractive payment system first. If they do not only lose this last 
monetary incentive to work but are also frustrated by the other reforms, they could stop to 
cooperate and to work properly. In consequence, either the university breaks down completely 
or is totally transformed into a hierarchy run by administrators instructing junior staff while 
paying lot of money to a useless class of (former) professors.  
 
Perhaps in preparation of this last scenario and anyway as a direct attack on the co-operative 
model, the corporate governance of universities is changed with the aim to give more powers 
to the leaders. The president and vice-presidents obtain more powers, both from above in 
form of some former rights of the state’s ministry and also from below like competences 
formally held by the senate of the university or its faculties. At the same time, these top 
executives are no longer elected by their internal peers but by a university’s council, at least 
half of its members being externs. The executives themselves may be from outside the 
university. At the faculty level, the formal power of the dean is raised while the normal   17
professors lose accordingly. However, at least here at the faculty level, it remains possible that 
the professors defend their rights and keep the structure of a co-operative, for example by 
electing a weak dean or keeping a tradition to rotate this job every year even if the legal time 
in office is much longer (normally four years now). Although it is possible to undermine the 
spirit of new laws, some determination to do so is needed. If there is disagreement inside the 
faculty, the letters of the law win more weight. 
 
Another area where the traditional model was attacked by politicians but seems successful in 
holding out is the boundary of the professors’ group. In the 1970s, there has been the 
construction of assistant professors that finally failed. The last federal government created the 
category of junior professor who should count as a professor and vote with them, have the 
right to promote others short after his or her own promotion and could use a tenure-track to 
change his or her temporary position in a permanent one. As long as the federal government 
gave money for every new junior professor, such positions have been created but ever since 
new setups are very few. The accompanying attempt to forbid the habilitation, the traditional 
highest academic qualification in Germany to become a professor, has been toppled by the 
federal constitutional court. Legally, there are different equal routes to a full professorship 
including the habilitation and the junior professorship now. Practically, the habilitation is still 
the silver bullet and even many junior professors are writing a habilitation thesis. The reason 
is the behaviour of the established professors, collectively upholding the old norm that a 
habilitation is expected to become a professor.   
 
Still another important change
18 is the introduction of tuition fees. First long-time students 
had to pay, now in many states tuition fees of € 500 every semester for most students are in 
place. This is not cost-covering but, at least in cheaper subjects, it can reach a substantial 
fraction of the costs. The tuition fees have to be used to improve teaching while hiring new 
professors or other teaching staff is not allowed. This would raise a faculty’s capacity and 
oblige it to take more students instead of improving the conditions for a given number. This 
shows how far German universities are regulated and away from proper markets. Nonetheless, 
it is a beginning to diversify to non-state funds and to respond to demand by students instead 
of only governmental planning figures. The universities also gain powers to choose their own 
students. The central placing service of students has been changed from an unavoidable 
                                                 
18 Still other important changes are the new bachelor and master degrees, the accreditation of programs of study, 
the contest to find elite-universities and the higher formalisation of doctoral studies. More reforms are to be 
expected.      18
bureaucracy to an optional service for universities. All these are first steps to change students 
from members of a co-operative university into customers.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The character of universities as co-operatives is under stress and the sponsorship by the state 
is reduced at the same time. These are two different but connected trends. The importance of 
markets is emphasised now although they are quasi-markets at best. There are some juridical 
risks in the political reforms from above but more important are the motivational and 
organisational perils. Established professors could lose their motivation and enjoy their 
freedom and tenure. Teaching of not too high quality could be guaranteed by a hierarchy but 
academic research and training new researchers would suffer badly. By all its shortcomings, 
the co-operative university has the advantages of being time-tested and possessing some 
coherence
19. These would allow it to adapt to a future with less state-sponsoring, whereas the 
simultaneous pressures to make internal reforms that are steered from the outside and also to 
manage with less money could be too much to bear. This would not be the end of universities 
in Germany but of the German university in its co-operative form, which can be traced back, 




                                                 
19 The idea of coherence is that there does not exist one best structure for complex organisations like universities. 
Very different organisations can be excellent, particular properties are less important than their combination. 
Different components may reinforce themselves and create synergies or be mutually exclusive. All this makes 
designing and changing such organisations very difficult because incremental improvements here or there may 
not work. Cf. Baron/Kreps 1999 and Roberts 2004.    19
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